Theorizing modernity and technology by Brey, Philip
The Need for Integrated Studies of Modernity and Technology
Technology made modernity possible. It has been the engine of moder-
nity, shaping it and propelling it forward. The Renaissance was made
possible by major fourteenth- and fifteenth-century inventions like the
mechanical clock, the full-rigged ship, fixed-viewpoint perspective,
global maps, and the printing press. The emergence of industrial society
in the eighteenth century was the result of an industrial revolution that
was made possible by technological innovations in metallurgy, chemical
technology, and mechanical engineering. The recent emergence of an in-
formation society is also the product of a largely technological revolu-
tion, in information technology. Technology has catalyzed the transition
to modernity and catalyzed major transitions within it. More than that,
technologies are and continue to be an integral part of the infrastructure
of modernity, being deeply implicated in its institutions, organizing and
reorganizing the industrial system of production, the capitalist economic
system, surveillance and military power; and shaping cultural symbols,
categories, and practices (see Lyon and Edwards, chapters 6 and 7 in
this volume).
If modernity is shaped by technology, then the converse also holds:
technology is a creation of modernity. The common wisdom of technol-
ogy studies, that technology is socially shaped or even socially con-
structed, that it is “society made durable,” implies that a full
understanding of modern technology and its evolution requires a con-
ception of modernity within which modern technology can be explained
as one of its products. If this holds for technology at large, it certainly
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also holds for particular technologies, technical artifacts, and systems.
These are also products of modernity and bear the imprint, not only of
the behaviors of actors immediately involved in their construction, but
also of the larger sociocultural and economic conditions within which
they are developed. To ignore this larger context is to leave out part of
the story that can be told about that technology. It would be like staging
Wagner’s Parsifal with only the actors on stage, without any settings,
costumes, or props.
In the current specialized academic landscape, modernity is the object
of study of modernity theory, and technology is studied in technology
studies. Few works exist that bridge these two fields and that study tech-
nology with extensive reference to modernity, or modernity with exten-
sive reference to technology, or that concentrate on both by studying the
way in which evolutions within modernity intersect with technological
changes. In modernity theory, technology is often treated as a “black
box” that is discussed, if at all, in abstract and often essentialist and
technological determinist terms. In technology studies, the black box of
technology is opened, and technologies and their development are stud-
ied in great empirical detail, yet technology studies generate their own
black box, which is society. The larger sociocultural and economic con-
text in which actors operate is either treated as a background phenome-
non to which some hand-waving references are made, or it is not treated
at all—a black box returned to sender, address unknown.
Undoubtedly, part of the reason that modernity theory has not ade-
quately come to grips with technology has been the lack of empirically
informed accounts of technology. It is only in the past few decades that
major progress has been made in our understanding of technology and
technological change, with the establishment of technology studies as a
mature field of study. The same reason cannot be given for the lack of
reference to modernity theory in technology studies because modernity
theory has been around a lot longer than technology studies. Here, this
lack of reference is more likely explained by the abstract and totalizing
character of many theories of modernity; their often inadequate ac-
counts of technology; the speculative, untested character of many of
their claims; and the difficulty of connecting the microlevel concepts of
technology studies to the macrolevel categories of modernity theory.
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These criticisms do not apply equally to all theories of modernity.
There is a world of difference between the abstract, totalizing theories of
modernity of classical critical theory, Marxism, and phenomenology,
and many recent theories of modernity, such as those of David Harvey
and Manuel Castells, that are empirically rich and mindful of hetero-
geneity and difference. So if the sociocultural and economic context that
is modernity ought to be considered in technology studies, then technol-
ogy studies should work to appropriate more adequate theories of moder-
nity, or start developing its own.1
It is time, then, to bridge the disciplinary gaps that now separate
modernity theory and technology studies and to work at empirically in-
formed and theoretically sophisticated accounts of technology, moder-
nity, and their mutual shaping. In this essay, I contribute to this task
through an analysis of the problems and misunderstanding that now
beset modernity theory and technology studies in their respective treat-
ment (or nontreatment) of technology and modernity.
A key conclusion is that the major obstacle to a future synthesis of
modernity theory and technology studies is that technology studies
mostly operate at the micro (and meso) level, whereas modernity theory
operates at the macrolevel, and it is difficult to link the two. I analyze
the micro-macro problem and ways in which it may be overcome in
technology studies and modernity theory. The next two sections provide
basic expositions of concepts, themes, and approaches in modernity the-
ory and technology studies. Their aim is to introduce these fields to
readers insufficiently familiar with them, as well as to set the stage for
the analysis that follows.
Modernity Theory: Understanding the Modern Condition
Structure and Aims
Modernity is the historical condition that characterizes modern soci-
eties, cultures, and human agents. Theories of modernity aim to describe
and analyze this historical condition. A distinction can be made between
cultural and epistemological theories of modernity, most of which are
found in the humanities, and institutional theories, which are common in
social theory—although in both traditions many theories of modernity
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can be found that blend cultural, institutional, and epistemological 
aspects.
Cultural and epistemological theories of modernity focus on the dis-
tinction between premodern and modern cultural forms and modes 
of knowledge. These theories usually place the transition from tradi-
tional society to modernity in the Renaissance period, in fifteenth- and
sixteenth-century Europe. The transition to modernity, in this concep-
tion, is characterized by the emergence of the notion of an autonomous
subject, the transition from an organic to a mechanistic world picture,
and the embrace of humanistic values and objective scientific inquiry.
Some theories date the transition to modernity later than this, as late as
the eighteenth century, during which Enlightenment thought had culmi-
nated in a genuine project of modernity, with universal pretensions to
progress, and with fully developed conceptions of objective science, uni-
versal morality and law, and autonomous art (e.g., Habermas 1983).
The cultural-epistemological approach to modernity dominates in phi-
losophy, with Hegel, Nietzsche, and Heidegger as early proponents, and
is also well represented in cultural history and cultural studies.
Many studies in the humanities that analyze modernity as a cultural
phenomenon also focus on modernism, which is a phenomenon distinct
from modernity. Modernism, or aesthetic modernism, as it is also called,
was a cultural movement that began in the mid-nineteenth century as a
reaction against the European realist tradition, in which works of art
were intended to “mirror” external nature or society, without any addi-
tions or subtractions by the artist. Modernist artists, in often quite dif-
ferent ways, rejected this realism and held that it is the form of works of
art, rather than their content, that guarantees authenticity and liberates
art from tradition. Modernism has been very influential in literature, in
the visual arts, and in architecture, with movements as diverse as natu-
ralism, expressionism, surrealism, and functionalism being collected
under it.
The emergence of modernism has often been explained by reference to
major social transformations in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century
modernity. David Harvey, for instance, has argued that modernism was
a cultural response to a crisis in the experience of space and time, 
which was the result of processes of time-space compression under late 
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nineteenth-century capitalism (Harvey 1989, chap. 8). The label “mod-
ernism” is also used in a broader sense, in which it does not refer to an
aesthetic movement, but to the culture and ideology of modernity at
large (e.g., Bell 1976). “Modernism,” in this sense, stands for positivism,
rationalism, the belief in linear progress and universal truth, the rational
planning of ideal social orders, and the standardization of knowledge
and production. When used in this latter sense, the notion of modernism
becomes almost interchangeable with the notion of modernity construed
as a cultural or epistemological condition (see Berman 1982).
Institutional theories of modernity focus on the social and institu-
tional structure of modern societies, and tend to locate the transition to
modernity in the eighteenth century, with the rise of industrial society in
Europe. Institutional theories of modernity are as old as social theory it-
self, with early proponents like Weber, Marx, and Durkheim outlining
key structural features of modern societies and theorizing major transi-
tions from traditional to modern society. Modernity, in the institutional
conception, is a mode of social life or organization rather than a cultural
or epistemological condition. It is characterized by institutional struc-
tures and processes, such as industrialism, capitalism, rationalization,
and reflexivity. It is with this institutional meaning of modernity that
one can correlate the notion of modernization, which is the transforma-
tion of traditional societies into industrial societies. Modernity used to
describe a condition that emerged in eighteenth-century European soci-
eties, but today it characterizes industrial societies around the globe.2
In my discussion of modernity theory, I give special emphasis to the
social theory tradition, with the understanding that much of this work
analyzes not only institutional aspects of modernity but cultural and
epistemological dimensions as well. Indeed, it is quite common to see
these aspects combined in social theories of modernity, even if institu-
tional features receive the most emphasis. This blending of traditions has
been particularly strong in critical theory, with authors like Habermas,
Marcuse, and Adorno referring to Hegel and Heidegger as liberally as to
Marx and Weber. However, it is also quite visible in more recent theo-
ries of modernity, such as those of Giddens, Harvey, Wagner, and
Castells, as well as in the early institutional theories of modernity devel-
oped by Weber and Marx.
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Theories of modernity in the social theory tradition present an ac-
count of the distinct structural features that characterize modern soci-
eties and the way these features came into being. Typically, they contain
most or all of the following elements:
• They draw the boundaries of modernity as a historical period, con-
trasting it with a premodern period and sometimes also with a postmod-
ern period.
• They describe and analyze the special features of modernity, with an
emphasis on institutional, cultural, or epistemological dimensions. They
almost invariably do this through macrolevel or “abstract” analysis.
However, they may contain various elaborations, case studies, or illustra-
tions of the macro theory.
• They (optionally) describe the dynamics of modernity, delineating 
(1) the historic changes that led to modern society, (2) various epochs
within modernity (e.g., early, high, and late modernity; classical and re-
flexive modernity), and (3) the transitions between these epochs.
• Some theories of modernity also contain normative evaluations or cri-
tiques of the condition of modernity. Some propose visions of an alter-
native society or speculate how present modernity may transform itself
into another type of social formation.
Next to grand theories of modernity, such as those of Marx, Weber,
Habermas, and Giddens, one can find studies of particular eras within
modernity, of major transitions and developments within the modern era,
and of particular features or structures of modernity. Theories of particular
eras within modernity attempt to characterize a particular historical epoch
and to analyze the transitions that led to it (Wagner 1994). Many contem-
porary social theorists focus on late modernity as a historical epoch emerg-
ing in the second half of the twentieth century, and attempt to characterize
its special features. Thus, one finds theories of “reflexive modernity” (Beck
et al. 1994), “the risk society” (Beck 1992), “postindustrial society” (Bell
1976; Touraine 1971), “the information age” and “the information soci-
ety” (Castells 1996; Schiller 1981), “the global age” (Albrow 1996), and
many others. Akin to these theories, one finds theories of postmodernity,
which hypothesize that we have already left (late) modernity and have 
recently entered a new postmodern era (e.g., Jameson 1991; Harvey 1989).
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Besides theories of particular eras in modernity, there are many stud-
ies of major sociocultural, technological, or economic transitions within
modernity. These range from studies of the scientific revolution and the
industrial revolution to studies of the control revolution (a revolution in
technologies of control that is claimed by Beniger [1989] to have paved
the way for the information society) or the emergence of Fordism, to
theories of the historical development of the modern subject and of new
modern forms of power (e.g., Foucault 1977). Not all these works ex-
plicitly situate the developments they analyze within the wider context
of modern social institutions and culture. Finally, one can find studies
that are concerned with particular aspects or structures of moder-
nity, such as modern identity (Lash and Friedman 1993; Giddens 
1991), capitalism (Sayer 1991), pornography (Hunt 1993), consumer
culture (Slater 1997), and gender (McGaw 1989; Marshall 1994; Felski
1995).
Not every work in social theory is a work in modernity theory. For it
to qualify as such, it would have to be centrally concerned with major
institutional, cultural, or epistemological aspects of or transformations
within modernity, such as capitalism, the autonomous self, modern
technology, and the Enlightenment. Alternatively, for phenomena that
are not inherently tied to modernity or at least do not define it, such as
pornography, adolescence, or the automobile, it would study these in re-
lation to the larger institutional, cultural, and epistemological context of
modernity. Thus, an analysis of adolescence would be a study in moder-
nity theory if it explicitly considered the historical, cultural, and institu-
tional constructions of adolescence in the modern era and changes in
these constructions over time, but not if it treated adolescence in a
largely ahistorical way (e.g., as a set of locally enacted constructions
with little historical continuity), or if it studied its historical treatment in
a particular country or setting without reference to its relation to mod-
ern social institutions and culture.3
Modernity and Social Theory
Theories of modernity have always held a prominent position in social
theory. What follows is a brief review. Any such review will have to
start with Karl Marx and Max Weber, who are often identified as the
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fathers of modernity theory. They are both known for their theories of
the transition between feudal and industrial society, and their theories of
(capitalist) industrial society. They are hence early proponents of institu-
tional theories of modernity and of the transition of the premodern to
the modern period.
In Marx’s historical materialist conception of modernity, the differ-
ence between the modern and the premodern era is characterized by
qualitative differences in the economic structure. The economic struc-
ture of a society is made up of production relations and it changes when
the development of the productive forces (means of production and
labor power) results in greater productive power. According to Marx,
the transition from feudal to capitalist society was caused by large in-
creases in productive power in feudal society. These increases caused
changes in production relations, and hence in the economic structure.
The resulting economic structure was capitalist in the late nineteenth
century, but Marx of course envisioned a transition to a post-class so-
cialist society, a transition that would occur when further increases in
production power made a socialist state possible. He hence envisioned
an early, capitalist, and a late, socialist state of modernity. Both are
characterized by an industrial system of production, but their social
form and culture are significantly different.
Weber (1958[1905]) did not see the transition from feudal to indus-
trial society as caused by the development of productive power. Instead,
he held that the capitalist economic system that made industrial society
possible was an outgrowth of the Protestant work ethic, which de-
manded hard work and the accumulation of wealth. Because capitalism
is profit based, it demanded rationalization so that results could be cal-
culated and so that efficiency and effectiveness could be increased. In
this way, rationalization became the distinguishing characteristic of
modern industrial societies. The rationalization of society is the wide-
spread acceptance of rules, efficiency, and practical results as the right
way to approach human affairs and the construction of a social organi-
zation around this notion. According to Weber, rationalization has a
dual face. On the one hand, it has enabled the liberation of humanity
from traditional constraints and has led to increased reason and free-
dom. On the other hand, it has also produced a new oppression, the
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“iron cage” of modern bureaucratic organizational forms that limit
human potential.4
Weber’s notion of rationalization as the hallmark of modernity has
been very influential in modernity theory. It has been particularly influ-
ential in critical theory, particularly with members of the Frankfurt
school such as Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Habermas, who
built on Weberian notions as well as Marxist ideas in formulating their
sweeping critiques of modern society (see, e.g., Marcuse 1964 and
Horkheimer and Adorno 1972). Jürgen Habermas, without doubt the
most influential scholar in the critical theory tradition, has advanced a
theory of modernity with strong Weberian and Marxist influences, in
which he analyzes modernity as an “unfinished project” (Habermas
1983). He theorizes an early phase of modernity and a later phase. Early
modernity witnessed the rise of the “bourgeois public sphere,” which
mediated between the state and the public sphere. In late modernity, the
state and private corporations took over vital functions of the public
sphere, as a result of which the public sphere became a sphere of domi-
nation (Habermas 1989).
Although he is critical of late modernity, Habermas sees an emancipa-
tory potential in early modernity, with its still-intact bourgeois public
sphere. He hence sees modernity as an “unfinished project” and has at-
tempted to redeem some elements of modernity (the Enlightenment ideal
of a rational society, the modern differentiation of cultural spheres with
autonomous criteria of value, the ideal of democracy) while criticizing
others (the dominant role of scientific-technological rationality, the cul-
ture of experts and specialists). Central in this undertaking has been his
distinction between two types of rationality: purposive or instrumental
rationality, which is a means for exchange and control and which is
based on a subject-object relationship, and communicative or social ra-
tionality, which is geared toward understanding and is based on a 
subject-subject relationship that is the basis for communicative action.
Habermas claims that there has been a one-sided emphasis since the En-
lightenment on instrumental, scientific-technological rationality, which
has stifled possibilities for expression. The result has been a colonization
of the lifeworld by an amalgamated system of economy and state, tech-
nology and science, that carries out its functional laws in all spheres of
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life. Habermas regards communicative action as a means to put bound-
aries on this system and to develop the lifeworld as a sphere of enlight-
ened social integration and cultural expression.
Looking beyond critical theory, one cannot escape the powerful
analysis of modernity in the work of Anthony Giddens (1990, 1991,
1994b). Giddens analyzes modernity as resting on four major institu-
tions: industrialism, capitalism, surveillance, and military power. These
and other institutions in modernity moreover exhibit an extreme dy-
namism and globalizing scope. To account for this dynamism, Giddens
identifies three developments. The first is the separation of time and
space, through new time- and space-organizing devices and techniques,
from each other and from the contextual features of local places to
which they were tied. Time and space become separate, empty parame-
ters that can be used as structuring principles for large-scale social and
technical systems. The second development is the disembedding of social
life, the removal of social relations and institutions from local contexts
by disembedding mechanisms, such as money, timetables, organization
charts, and systems of expert knowledge. Disembedding mechanisms de-
fine social relations and guide social interactions without reference to
the peculiarities of place. The third development is the reflexive appro-
priation of knowledge, which is the production of systematic knowledge
about social life that is then reflexively applied to social activity. Jointly,
these developments create a social dynamic of displacement, impersonal-
ity, and risk. These can be overcome through reembedding (the manufac-
ture of familiarity), trust (in the reliability of disembedding mechanisms),
and intimacy (the establishment of relationships of trust with others
based on mutual processes of self-disclosure).
Risk, trust, and the reflexive appropriation of knowledge are also cen-
tral themes in Ulrich Beck’s theory of (late) modernity (Beck 1992).
Beck distinguishes two stages of modernization, the first of which is sim-
ple modernization: the transformation of agrarian society into industrial
society. The second stage, which began in the second half of the twenti-
eth century, is that of reflexive modernization. This is a process in which
modern society confronts itself with the negative consequences of (sim-
ple) modernization and moves from a conflict structure based on the dis-
tribution of goods to a model based on the distribution of risks. Our
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current society is the risk society, in which risks are manufactured by in-
stitutions and can be distributed in different ways. The distribution of
risk occurs with major social transformations at the backdrop, transfor-
mations in which traditional social forms such as family and gender
roles, which continued to play an important role in industrial society,
are in the risk society undergoing radical change, leading to a progres-
sive “individualization of inequality.”
The idea that modernity has recently entered a new phase is pervasive
in contemporary social theory, even among those authors that stop
short of claiming that we have entered or are entering a phase of post-
modernity. Intensifying globalization, the expansion and intensification
of social reflexivity, the proliferation of nontraditional social forms, the
fragmentation of authority, the fusion of political power and expertise,
the transition to a post-Fordist economy that is no longer focused on
mass production and consumption and in which the production of signs
and spaces becomes paramount—all have been mentioned as recent de-
velopments that point to a new stage of reflexive or radicalized moder-
nity (e.g., Lash and Urry 1994; Beck et al. 1994; Giddens 1990, 1994b;
Albrow 1996; Lipietz 1987), with most authors identifying the late
1970s as a transition period. Many authors point specifically to the rev-
olution in information technology in claiming that we have entered an
information age (or, equivalently, a postindustrial age) in which an
economy based on information, not goods, has become the organizing
principle of society (e.g., Bell 1976; see Webster 1995 for an overview).
In the transition from an industrial to an information society, the eco-
nomic system is transformed, and along with it the occupational struc-
ture, the structure of organizations, and social structure and culture at
large. According to Manuel Castells, who has presented the most com-
prehensive theory of the information society to date, the basic unit of
economic organization in the information age is the network, made up
of subjects and organizations, and continually modified as networks
adapt to their (market) environments. Castells argues that contemporary
society is characterized by a bipolar opposition between the Net (the ab-
stract universalism of global networks) and the Self (the strategies by
which people try to affirm their identities), which is the source of new
forms of social struggle (Castells 1996, 1997, 1998).
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Modernity and Postmodernity
Not all scholars agree that modernity is still the condition that we are
in. Theorists of postmodernity claim that we have recently entered an
era of postmodernity, which follows modernity. Postmodernity is often
considered, like modernity, to be a historical condition. Most theorists
who consider postmodernity in this way place the transition from mod-
ern to postmodern society somewhere in the 1960s or 1970s, although
some hold that we are still in the middle of a transition phase. They hold
that changes in society over the past century accumulated during these
decades to produce a society whose institutional, cultural, or epistemo-
logical condition is sufficiently different from that of modern society to
warrant the new label.
Many postmodern theorists point only to cultural changes to support
this claim. Some, however, emphasize technological and economic changes
and see changes in cultural and social forms as resulting from them.
David Harvey emphasizes the 1970s transition from a Fordist economy
of mass production and consumption to a global post-Fordist regime
characterized by greater product differentiation, intensified rates of tech-
nological and organizational innovation, and more flexible use of labor
power (Harvey 1989). Frederick Jameson has theorized a transition to
“late capitalism,” which is global and in which all realms of personal
and social life and spheres of knowledge are turned into commodities.
He claims that late capitalism comes with its own cultural logic, which
is postmodernism (Jameson 1991). Lash and Urry (1994) point to the
shift from an economy of goods to an economy of signs and spaces, as
does Jean Baudrillard (1995), who claims that information technology,
mass media, and cybernetics have effected a transition from an era of in-
dustrial production to an era of simulation, in which models, signs, and
codes determine new social orders. The culture of postmodernity is
often characterized by consumerism, commodification, the simulation of
knowledge and experience; the blurring if not disappearance of the dis-
tinction between representation and reality; and an orientation on the
present that erases both past history and a sense of a significantly differ-
ent future. The cultural shifts also include a decline in epistemic and po-
litical authority, the fragmentation of experience and personal identity,
and the emergence of a disorienting postmodern hyperspace.
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Not all postmodern theorists hold postmodernity to be a historical
condition, however. For some, like Jean-François Lyotard, postmoder-
nity is rather a cultural or epistemological form that is not essentially
tied to a particular historical period. Lyotard holds that within contem-
porary society, one can find both modern and postmodern forms exist-
ing together.5 The characteristic of postmoderns like Lyotard is that
they resist the modern form. For Lyotard, modernity is equivalent to
reason, the Enlightenment, totalizing and universalizing thought, and
grand historical narratives. It is equivalent to what I identified earlier as
modernism in a broad sense, that is, the culture and ideology of moder-
nity. Lyotard criticizes the modern form of knowledge and calls for new
kinds of knowledge that do not impose a grid on reality, but that em-
phasize difference. Lyotard’s cultural critique is also a critique of schol-
arly method. He argues that postmodern scholars should not do theory.
They are also not to produce new grand narratives of society, but should
deconstruct and criticize modernist claims for universalistic knowledge
by doing local, microlevel studies that emphasize heterogeneity and plu-
rality (Lyotard 1984a). He rejects the old methodology of social theory,
along with any and all of its theoretical claims. This call for a postmod-
ernization of the social sciences and humanities has been echoed by
Richard Rorty, Jacques Derrida, and Zygmunt Bauman, and can be seen
in the profusion of postmodern case studies and analyses that uncover
difference and heterogeneity and celebrate cultural “others.”
Postmodern theorists thus range from writers like Jameson and Har-
vey, who study postmodernity as a historical era, to those like Lyotard
and Rorty, who criticize modernist ideology and develop and employ
postmodern methodologies for the humanities and social sciences. As a
critique of modernist thought, postmodernism is moreover an intellec-
tual orientation that is different from, even if it overlaps with, aesthetic
postmodernism, which has emerged in literature, architecture, and the
visual arts since the 1960s and 1970s as a response to aesthetic mod-
ernism. Critics of (academic) postmodernism, which include Habermas
and Giddens, criticize both the hypothesized transition from modernity
to postmodernity and the intellectual attitude of postmodern scholars. 
Giddens, for example, claims that in spite of the discontinuities cited by
postmodernists, the major institutions of modernity as it existed in the
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nineteenth century and the early twentieth century—industrialism, capi-
talism, surveillance, and military power—are still in place, and he there-
fore only wants to go as far as to theorize a late or “radicalized” stage
of modernity (Giddens 1990). He and Habermas have both criticized
postmodernism’s antitheoretical attitude, its epistemological and moral
relativism, its irrationalism, and its laissez-faire attitude to politics 
(Giddens 1990; Habermas 1987). Similar debates exist within postmod-
ern theory, with Harvey (1989) theorizing a transition to postmodernity
while criticizing postmodernist thought, and Lyotard (1984b) criticizing
Jameson’s “totalizing dogmas” and defense of master narratives.6
Technology Studies: New Visions of Technology
Technology Studies as a Field
“Technology studies” is the name for a loosely knit multidisciplinary
field with a wide variety of contributing disciplines, such as sociology,
history, cultural studies, anthropology, policy studies, urban studies,
and economics. Technology studies are concerned with the empirical
study of the development of technical artifacts, systems, and techniques
and their relation to society. Technology studies are part of science and
technology studies, or STS, a larger field that emerged in the 1970s and
that is based on studies of science and technology and their relation to
society that are both empirically informed and on sound theoretical
footing. STS is today an established discipline, with departments 
and programs around the world, as well as specialized conferences and
journals.7
A full review of theories and approaches in technology studies is well
beyond the scope of this paper and is complicated because of the relative
youth of the field and the diversity of its topics and approaches. In what
follows, I focus on two subfields of technology studies that are at the
core of many STS departments and programs. They are social studies of
technology, which look at social and cultural aspects of technology, and
the history of technology, which studies the historical development of
technologies and their relation to society.8 In discussing the history 
of technology, moreover, I focus on contextual approaches, which 
are dominant in STS, and which look at the historical development of
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technologies in relation to their social context, instead of taking an 
internalist approach that focuses on purely scientific and technological
contexts only.9 This selective choice means that I ignore, among other
studies, the important work that has been done in two distinct fields:
economics of technology and philosophy of technology.10
Contemporary technology studies, with their focus on social, cultural,
and historical dimensions, cover a wide variety of topics. Scholars rarely
consider “Technology-with-a-capital-T.” Instead, they examine specific
technologies, such as genetic engineering or nuclear technology; specific
engineering fields and approaches, such as mechanical engineering or
cold fusion research; specific techniques, such as rapid prototyping or
cerebral angiography; and technical artifacts, machines, materials, and
built structures, such as ceramic vases, Van de Graaff generators, poly-
styrene, and the Eiffel Tower. In addition, many scholars study large
technological systems, such as railroad systems or early warning systems
in missile defense, and the processes of technological change, such as the
development of the bicycle in the nineteenth century or the invention
and development of electric lighting.
Technology studies analyze these technological entities in relation to
their social context. Roughly, this is done in one of three ways. In one
set of studies, the focus is on the shaping of the technology itself and the
role of societal processes. How did the technology come into existence?
What (social) factors played a role in this process? What modifications
has it undergone since it first came into being, and why did these occur?
In other studies, the focus is on how a technology has shaped society,
or, alternatively, on the social changes that accompanied the introduc-
tion and use of the technology. In yet other studies, these processes are
considered together, emphasizing how a technology and its social con-
text co-evolve, or co-construct each other. A significant proportion of
work that takes up this co-construction theme even denies that there is a
meaningful distinction between technology and society, and attempts to
study “sociotechnology,” which consists of dynamic seamless webs of
entities that are only labeled as technological or social after they have
fully evolved (Bijker and Law 1992; Latour 1987; Callon 1987). There
is also a fourth category of studies in technology, which historian John
Staudenmaier (1985: p. 17) calls “externalist,” that do not focus on
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technology per se but only on contextual aspects, such as engineer-ing
communities, technological support networks, or public images of tech-
nology.
The core of contemporary technology studies consists of social studies
of technology and the history of technology, both of which have been
influenced by New Left critiques of science and technology. I discuss
these two subfields in order. In social studies of technology, the research
focus is on the social contexts in which technologies are developed and
used, such as engineering labs, factories, and homes. The research exam-
ines how elements in these contexts interact with each other and with
the technology in question. Such elements include individual agents and
social groups, along with their behaviors, interactions, identities, and
statuses (gender, race, class), as well as organizational structures, insti-
tutional settings, and cultural contexts.
Contemporary social studies of technology are in large part an out-
growth of social studies of science. The specific tradition of which it is
an outgrowth is sometimes called sociology of scientific knowledge
(SSK). The SSK approach to the sociology of science, which is the domi-
nant approach today, holds that scientific knowledge itself, and not just
the social and institutional context of scientific inquiry, ought to be the
key focus of the sociology of science. SSK holds that scientific knowl-
edge is not a rational process exempt from social influences, but a social
process, and that scientific truth is not objectively given but socially con-
structed. This SSK approach deviates from what was the dominant ap-
proach in the sociology of science until the late 1970s: the Mertonian
approach, named after Robert K. Merton, which focused only on the in-
stitutional context of scientific inquiry while assuming that scientific in-
quiry itself is by and large rational and objective. SSK also distinguishes
itself from traditional (positivist) philosophy of science and epistemol-
ogy, which also holds scientific inquiry and truth to be rational and 
objective. Instead, it takes its inspiration from philosopher of science
Thomas Kuhn’s work on the structure of scientific revolutions, which is
critical of images of science as a rational and cumulative process (Kuhn
1962).11
It was a founding principle of SSK that “nature” and “rationality”
and “truth” in science do not explain the process of scientific inquiry,
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but are themselves contingent social constructs that must be explained.
This central principle was extended in the early 1980s, when some
SSKers began to publish work in social studies of technology. The prin-
ciple is modified to read: the working of machines does not provide an
explanation of technological and social change, but is itself something
that must be explained, at least in part by investigating social agents,
their interactions, and their beliefs about technology.12 Technology is re-
garded, in part or wholly, as a social construction that must be ex-
plained by reference to social processes, and within which no appeal 
can be made to objective standards of truth, efficiency or technological
rationality.
Although some contemporary work in (contextual) history of technol-
ogy finds inspiration in social studies of technology, the history of tech-
nology is itself a much older field (Cutcliffe and Post 1989; Westrum
1991; Staudenmaier 1985; Fox 1999). Yet, although there has always
been an interest in the social context of technology in the history of
technology, approaches that put this social context at center stage have
only recently come to dominate. A typical study in a contextual history
of technology considers how a particular technology, such as electric
power transmission, the internal combustion engine, or the personal
computer, evolved historically and how the technology came to 
reflect the contexts in which it has been developed and used. The investi-
gation is often bounded in time (a particular historical era or develop-
ment stage of the technology) and space (a particular geographical area
or setting). Contextual elements that such historians consider may in-
clude organizational, policy, and legal settings, including relevant indi-
vidual actors, social groups, and organizations (engineers, firms,
industries, government bodies, activist groups) and their discourses and
behaviors. In sociohistorical studies of technology, in which social stud-
ies of technology intersect with the history of technology, the develop-
ment of technologies is studied with special reference to their social
contexts and uses (see Bijker 1995b for a review).
Most studies in social studies and the history of technology are case
studies that consider particular settings or events in which technologies
are developed and used.13 Others are what John Staudenmaier (1985: 
p. 206) calls “expanded studies,” which look more broadly at several
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types of technologies or several types of settings or historical episodes.
Yet other studies are primarily theoretical or methodological, focusing
on such issues as technological determinism or the interpretive flexibility
of technological artifacts, or on methodological issues within technology
studies. Most studies operate at a micro or mesolevel of analysis, focus-
ing on individual actors, social groups and organizations, and their in-
teractions, rather than on the macrolevel of institutions and cultural
frameworks. The research methods are diverse and include textual
analysis, discourse analysis, participant observation, ethnomethodology,
and quantitative analysis.
Theoretical Claims of Technology Studies
The strong empirical orientation of most work in social studies and the
history of technology is visible, not only in its case analyses, but also in
its theoretical and methodological assumptions, which have often been
inspired by, or modified as a result of, these case studies. As a conse-
quence of this, there has been a fair amount of agreement on a number
of theoretical assumptions. I will try to characterize some of these as-
sumptions, along with some others that are also salient but more 
controversial.
One of the most central theoretical assumptions in technology studies
is the assumption that technology is socially shaped. Technological
change is conditioned by social factors, and technological designs and
functions are the outcome of social processes rather than of internal
standards of scientific-technological rationality; technology is society
made durable.14 The social shaping thesis denies the technological deter-
minist idea that technological change follows a fixed, linear path, which
can be explained by reference to some inner technological “logic,” or
perhaps through economic laws. Instead, technological change is radi-
cally underdetermined by such constraint and involves technological con-
troversies, disagreements, and difficulties that engage different actors or
relevant social groups in strategies to shape technology according to their
own insights.
Some scholars may discern technological or scientific constraints 
on technological change, but others point out that such constraints, if
they exist at all, are themselves also socially shaped—for example, 
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expectations of growth within the business, engineering, or user com-
munities. Also, while some scholars recognize separate stages in the de-
velopment of technology (e.g., invention, development, innovation),
others, particularly in social studies of technology, analyze technological
change as an entirely contingent and messy process, in which heteroge-
neous factors affect technological outcomes, and in which the process of
invention continues after technologies leave the laboratory or factory.
These scholars emphasize that users, regulators, and others also affect
the design and operation of technologies and the way in which technolo-
gies are interpreted and used (Bijker 1992; Lie and Sørenson 1996; Oud-
shoorn and Pinch forthcoming). In contrast to a linear-path model of
technological change, proposals have been made for a variation and se-
lection model, according to which technological change is multidirec-
tional: there are always multiple varieties of particular design concepts,
of which some die, and others, which have a good fit with social con-
text, survive (e.g., Pinch and Bijker 1987; Ziman 2000).
The social-shaping thesis implies a weak constructivist claim that
technological configurations are variable and strongly conditioned by
social factors. Social constructivist approaches go beyond this claim to
arrive at the strong constructivist claim that technological change can be
entirely analyzed as the result of processes of social negotiation and in-
terpretation, and that the properties of technologies are not objective,
but are effectively read into the technologies by social groups. Social
constructivism is hence a contemporary form of idealism, denying the
possibility or desirability of a reference to any “real” structures or forces
beyond the representations of social groups. Whether a certain technol-
ogy works or is efficient or user-friendly, and the nature of its functions,
powers, and effects is not a pregiven, but the outcome of social processes
or negotiation and interpretation.15
Those social-shaping theorists who do not embrace social construc-
tivism also recognize that the meaning or use of technologies is not pre-
given. Most theorists agree that technology has interpretive flexibility,
meaning that technologies can be interpreted and used in different ways
(Pinch and Bijker 1987). When social negotiations surrounding techno-
logical change come to a close, interpretive flexibility is held to diminish
because the technology stabilizes, along with concomitant (co-produced)
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meanings and social relations. Stabilization implies the embedding of
the technology in a stable network consisting of humans and other tech-
nologies, and the acceptance of a dominant view on how to interpret
and use the technology. Stabilization of a technology implies that its
contents are “black-boxed” and are no longer a subject of controversy.
Its stabilized properties come to determine the way that the technology
functions in society. Yet, black boxes can be reopened. The history of
technology shows how technologies such as the telephone, the Internet,
or the automobile take on particular functions or societal roles that may
vary from time to time and place to place.
The flip side of the claim that technology is socially shaped is the
claim that society is technologically shaped, meaning that technologies
shape their social contexts. This goes considerably beyond the claim that
new technologies may open up new possibilities that change society, or
that technologies may have side effects. Obviously, the steam engine
changed society by making new types of industrial production possible,
and the printing press effected change by making written information
more available and easier to distribute. Obviously, also, technologies
may have side effects such as environmental pollution or unemploy-
ment. The technological-shaping thesis refers not just to such recognized
functions and side effects of technologies, but to the multiplicity of func-
tions, meanings, and effects that always, often quite subtly, accompany
the use of a technology. Technologies become part of the fabric of soci-
ety, part of its social structure and culture, transforming it in the process.
The idea of society as a network of social relations is false, because soci-
ety is made up of sociotechnical networks, consisting of arrangements of
linked human and nonhuman actors.
The notion of a sociotechnical network is a central notion in actor-
network theory (ANT), which is a third influential approach to technol-
ogy studies, next to the social-shaping and social-construction approaches.
It studies the stabilization processes of technical and scientific objects as
these result from the building of actor networks, which are networks of
human actors and natural and technical phenomena. Actor-network
theorists employ a principle of generalized symmetry, according to
which any element (social, natural, or technical) in a heterogeneous 
network of entities that participate in the stabilization of a technology
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has a similar explanatory role (Callon 1987; Latour 1987; Callon and
Latour 1992). Social constructivism is criticized by ANT for giving spe-
cial preference to social elements, such as social groups and interpreta-
tion processes, on which its explanations are based, whereas natural or
technical elements, such as natural forces and technical devices, are pro-
hibited from being explanatory elements. Actor-network theory allows
technical devices and natural forces to be actors (or “actants”) in net-
works through which technical or scientific objects are stabilized. By an
analysis of actor networks, any entity can be shown to be a post hoc
construction, but entities are not normally socially constructed because
stabilization is not the result of social factors alone.
The notion that society is technologically shaped means, according to
most scholars in technology studies, that technology seriously affects 
social roles and relations; political arrangements; organizational struc-
tures; and cultural beliefs, symbols, and experiences. Technology scholars
have claimed that technical artifacts sometimes have built-in political con-
sequences (Winner 1980), that they may contain gender biases (Wajcman
1991; Bray 1997), that they may subtly guide the behavior of their users
(Sclove 1995; Latour 1992), that they may presuppose certain types of
users and may fail to accommodate nonstandard users (Akrich 1992) and
that they may modify fundamental cultural categories used in human
thought (Turkle 1984, 1995).
Latour (1992), for example, discusses how mundane artifacts, such as
seat belts and hotel keys, may direct their users toward certain behav-
iors. Hotel keys in Europe often have heavy weights attached to compel
hotel guests to bring their key to the reception desk upon leaving their
room. Winner (1980) argues that nuclear power plants require central-
ized, hierarchical managerial control for their proper operation. They
cannot be safely operated in an egalitarian manner, unlike, for example,
solar energy technology. In this way, nuclear plants shape society by 
requiring a particular mode of social organization for their operation.
Sclove (1995) points out that modern sofas with two or three separate
seat cushions define distinct personal spaces, and thus work to both re-
spect and perpetuate the emphasis of modern western culture on individ-
uality and privacy, in contrast to, for example, Japanese futon sofa-beds.
Finally, Turkle (1984) discusses how computers and computer-operated
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toys affect conceptions of life. Because computer toys are capable of be-
haviors that inanimate objects are not normally capable of, they lead chil-
dren to reassess the traditional dividing lines between “alive” and “not
alive” and hence to develop a different concept of “alive.” Most authors
would not want to claim that technologies have inherent power to effect
such changes. Rather, it is technologies in use, technologies that are al-
ready embedded in a social context and that have been assigned an in-
terpretation, that may generate such consequences.
To conclude, the major insights of technology studies have been that
technologies are socially shaped and at the same time society is shaped
by technology, or, alternatively, that society and technology co-construct
each other. They are not separate structures or forces, but are deeply in-
terwoven. Moreover, technological change is not a linear process but
proceeds by variation and selection, and technologies have interpretive
flexibility, implying that their meanings and functions and even (accord-
ing to social constructivists) their contents are continually open to rene-
gotiation by users and others.
Technology Studies and Modernity Theory: Mutual Criticism
The Treatment of Technology in Modernity Theory
It is difficult to overlook the pervasive role of technology in the making
of modernity. As argued earlier, technology is a central means by which
modernity is made possible. It is a catalyst for change and a necessary
condition for the functioning of modern institutions. However, it is
more than that. What can be learned from technology studies is that the
institutions and culture of modernity are not just shaped or influenced
by technology, they are also formed by it. The social systems of moder-
nity are sociotechnical systems, with technology an integral part of the
workings of social institutions. Social institutions are societal structures
that regulate and coordinate behavior and in this way determine how
certain societal needs are met. In the modern age, however, their regula-
tive functions are no longer a direct outcome of collective actions, since
most collective actions have become thoroughly mediated and shaped by
modern technologies, which function as co-actors. For example, collec-
tive acts of voting are now thoroughly mediated by voting technologies
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that help determine whether people get to vote at all, how votes are de-
fined, and whether votes are counted. Modern culture is, likewise, a
technological culture, in which technologies are not just material sub-
strates of existing cultural patterns, but also have a major role in defin-
ing, shaping, and transforming cultural forms. Information technology,
for example, is transforming basic cultural concepts and experiences
such as those of time, space, reality, privacy, and community and is also
effecting fundamental shifts in cultural practices.
If this analysis of the role of technology in modernity is anywhere
near correct, then it is surprising, to say the least, to find that technology
is not a central topic in the vast literature in modernity theory. Indeed,
of the many hundreds of books that bear the word “modernity” in the
title, fewer than a handful also refer to technology or one of its major
synonyms or metonyms (e.g., technological, computers, biotechnology,
industrial).16 Many of the major works in modernity theory make only
passing reference to technology. For example, technology is referenced
only once in the recent edited volume, Theories of Modernity and Post-
modernity; it is not mentioned at all in Zygmunt Bauman’s Intimations
of Postmodernity; and there are only four or five brief references to it 
in Alain Touraine’s Critique of Modernity (see Turner 1990; Bauman
1992; Touraine 1995).
What can explain this apparent neglect of technology in modernity
theory? It is not denial that technology has an important role in the con-
stitution of modernity, for most authors would agree that its role is piv-
otal. A better explanation is that the dominant dimensions along which
modernity has traditionally been analyzed (institutional, cultural, and
epistemological) have not allowed technology to play a major identifi-
able role, but have instead assigned it the status of a background condi-
tion. Technology is often analyzed as a mere catalyst of institutional,
cultural, and epistemological change, or as a mere means through which
institutions, cultural forms, and knowledge structures are realized.
In institutional analyses, modernity is analyzed as being constituted
by institutions and their transformations. Technology is not usually rec-
ognized as an institution itself; it is not seen as a separate regulative
framework such as capitalism, government, or the family, but rather as
one of the means through which these frameworks operate. More often
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than not, institutions such as capitalism, industrialism, or military
power are discussed without specific reference to the technologies that
sustain them. The role of technology in transforming these institutions
(e.g., in the transition to an information society) is more difficult to ig-
nore. However, here one often finds technology subsumed as part of a
broader phenomenon, such as rationalization (Weber), productive
forces (Marx), or disembedding mechanisms (Giddens), of which it is
only a part. Even in Marxist theory, which assigns an important role to
production technology in the making of modernity, this technology still
only serves as an external constraint on economic structure, which ulti-
mately determines the social forms of society.
In most cultural and epistemological theories of modernity, technology
is either analyzed as a mere catalyst of cultural and epistemological
changes, or it is robbed of its materiality and reduced to knowledge, lan-
guage, or ideas. In Heidegger’s critique of modernity, in which technology
“enframes” us and turns the world into “standing reserves,” technology
turns out not to be defined as a material process or as a mode of action,
but as a particular mode of thinking (Heidegger 1977). The same ideal-
ism is also visible in much of critical theory, in spite of its greater em-
phasis on social institutions. There, technology is often identified with
technological or formal rationality, which is a mode of thinking that
characterizes not only modern technology but also modern thought and
economic and social processes. Habermas, moreover, has defined tech-
nology as “technological knowledge and ideas about technology”
(Habermas 1987: p. 228). Finally, in postmodern theory, technology is
often reduced to language, signs, or modes of knowledge, along with
everything else.
When technology is referred to in modernity theory without being re-
duced to something else, still other problems emerge. One is the level of
abstraction at which technology is discussed: technology is usually
treated as a monolith, as a macroscopic entity, Technology-with-a-
capital-T, about which broad generalizations are made that are sup-
posed to apply equally to nuclear technology and dental technology, to
vacuum cleaners and gene splicers. This abstract, undifferentiated treat-
ment leads to vagueness, obscures differences between technologies, and
fails to distinguish the varied ingredients that make up technology
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(knowledge, artifacts, systems, actions) and the way these relate to their
context.
Giddens, for example, employs the notion of an “expert system,”
which is a key mechanism for decontextualizing social relations. He de-
fines expert systems as “systems of technical accomplishment or profes-
sional expertise that organize large areas of the material and social
environments in which we live today” (Giddens 1990: p. 27). He dis-
cusses few examples of expert systems, but makes it clear that virtually
any system in which the knowledge of experts is integrated and that
contains relevant safety measures qualifies as an expert system, includ-
ing automobiles, intersections, buildings, and railroad systems. More-
over, Giddens goes into hardly any detail on the way in which expert
systems decontextualize social relations.
A monolithic treatment of technology easily leads to essentialism and
reification. In an essentialist conception, technology has fixed, context-
independent properties that apply to all technologies. As Andrew Feen-
berg (1999a: pp. viii–ix) has argued, technological essentialism usually
construes technology’s essence as its instrumental rationality and its
functionalism, which reduces everything to functions and raw materials.
This essentialism often correlates with a reified conception of technol-
ogy, according to which it is a “thing,” with static properties, that inter-
acts with other “things,” such as the economy and the state. Essentialism
and reification, in turn, have a tendency to promote technological deter-
minism, in which technology develops according to an internal logic,
uninfluenced by social factors, and operates as an autonomous force in
society, generating social consequences that are unavoidable.17 Techno-
logical determinism is evident in dystopian critiques of modernity, such
as those of Heidegger, Marcuse, and Ellul, in which technology engulfs
humanity and rationalizes society and culture. In many other theories of
modernity, it is also present, albeit in a more subtle way. Marx’s thesis
that the productive forces determine or constrain production relations
has often been interpreted as a form of technological determinism.
Daniel Bell (1976) presents a similar view in characterizing the transi-
tion to a postindustrial society as the result of economic changes that
are due to increased productivity, which is conditioned by information
technology. Baudrillard (1995) construes the transition from modernity
6641 CH02 UG  9/12/02  5:43 PM  Page 57
58 Philip Brey
to postmodernity in technological determinist terms by analyzing it as
the result of information technology and media, whose models and
codes yield a new social order. James Beniger’s (1989) detailed historical
study of the making of the information society is also built on techno-
logical determinist principles, with technological change being a cause
of social change, while itself remaining relatively independent of social
influences.
In conclusion, the treatment of technology in modernity theory is
problematic in several respects. Often, technology is not assigned a
major role in modernity; it is subsumed under broader or narrower phe-
nomena or one-dimensional phenomena; its treatment is often abstract,
leading to vagueness, overgeneralization, detachment from context, and
a failure to discern detailed mechanisms of change. In addition, technol-
ogy is often reified and essentialized, and the conceptions of it are often
deterministic. There is also the problem that modernity theory’s sweep-
ing generalizations about technologies do not normally rest on micro-
level elaborations of the macro theory or on case studies. Modernity
theory’s generalizations, it will be clear by now, tend to go against many
key ideas of technology studies (the social character of technology and
its interpretive flexibility, the path dependence of technological change,
etc.). Moreover, when theories of modernity provide inadequate ac-
counts of technology and its role in modernity, their accounts of social
institutions, culture, and the dynamics of modernity suffer as well.
There are theories that avoid many of the problems listed (e.g., Castells
1996), but they are exceptions to the rule.
The Treatment of Modernity in Technology Studies
Modernity theory must provide an account of technology because of its
major role in the shaping of modernity. Technology studies, on the con-
trary, do not seem to require a consideration of modernity in their
analyses of technology. It is not obvious that a historical study of the
telephone or an analysis of the development and advertisement of fluo-
rescent lighting must refer to macroscopic structures and events such as
disembedding mechanisms and changes in capitalist production modes.
And in fact, most work in technology studies does not refer to such
macro structures but instead remains at the micro (or meso) level. It
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studies actors (individuals, social groups, organizational units); their
values, beliefs, and interests; their relations and (inter)actions; and the
way in which these shape or are shaped by specific technologies. Case
studies and extended studies based on this approach contain rich de-
scriptions of complex dynamics that lead to social and technological
outcomes. However, the aim of many of these studies is not just to de-
scribe what happens, but also to explain why it happened. For example,
in analyzing the history of the Penny Farthing bicycle, Pinch and Bijker
(1987: p. 24) do not want to only describe various bicycle models and
the social groups involved in their manufacture and use; they want to
understand the factors that determine what models are successful and
the reasons social groups assign certain meanings to a model. I argue
that microlevel accounts cannot fully explain technological and social
change unless they are linked with macrolevel accounts.
The main reason for this is that a sufficiently rich account of actors
and their relationships, beliefs, and behaviors requires an analysis of the
wider sociocultural and economic context in which these actors are 
operating. This broader analysis is needed to explain why actors have
certain attitudes, values, beliefs, or relationships, and it may even be
necessary to infer their very existence. For example, an understanding of
why certain types of men were attracted to high-wheeled bicycles in late 
nineteenth-century England, and perhaps also the identification of social
groups with this attraction, is likely to require an account of masculine
culture in late nineteenth-century England. The failure to look at this
cultural context would result in superficial and possibly also unreliable
descriptions of actors. More generally, to base explanations of tech-
nological and social change merely on observations of actors and 
their behaviors would be to subscribe to a form of methodological indi-
vidualism, a questionable form of reductionism that holds that social 
explanations can be reduced to facts about individuals and hence that
no reference to supraindividual social structures is required (Lukes
1994).
Granted, the actors in technology studies also include more complex
entities, such as social groups and organizations, and nonhuman actors
such as machines, but these are still particular actors to which agency is
attributed, frequently along with beliefs and attitudes. If the actions, 
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beliefs, and attitudes of these actors are not related to wider sociocul-
tural contexts, then any explanation is likely to fall short. This is a recur-
ring problem in most approaches in technology studies that emphasize 
an actor perspective, including social-shaping and social-constructivist 
approaches and the actor-network approach of Bruno Latour, Michel
Callon, John Law, and their associates. This latter approach does relate
the properties of individual actors to a wider context, which is the net-
work of actors in which they are operating, and holds that this network
defines these properties. However, the networks are limited in scope, usu-
ally containing only the actors thought to have a direct role in the devel-
opment or functioning of a particular technology. Actor-network studies
rarely provide sufficiently complete accounts of the networks that shape
the behaviors or attitudes of the other actors in the network (e.g., engi-
neers, corporations, or politicians), who therefore tend to be analyzed in a
methodological individualist way.18
There is also another reason microlevel approaches have only limited
explanatory power. As Paul Edwards points out (chapter 7, this vol-
ume), a major distinguishing feature of modern societies is their reliance
on infrastructures, large sociotechnical systems such as information and
communications networks, energy infrastructures, and banking and 
finance institutions. As Edwards argues, these infrastructures mediate
among the actors that are studied in microlevel analysis. In this sense
they function as disembedding mechanisms, defining social relations and
guiding social interactions over large distances of time and space (Brey
1998). However, these infrastructures themselves are best studied at the
macrolevel. Microlevel approaches that ignore infrastructures run the
risk of providing an insufficient account of the relations between actors
in modernity (whereas accounts of social relations in premodern soci-
eties can more easily remain at the microlevel because they are not usu-
ally mediated by infrastructures). The recent transition to a post-Fordist,
global economy has heightened the inadequacy of microlevel analyses
by fragmenting industrial production and marketing and reorganizing it
on a global scale (Rosen 1993).
Social constructivists, while acknowledging the need to consider 
the societal context in which actors operate, have sometimes objected 
to an appeal to social theory because of its “realism,” which would be
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incompatible with (strong) social constructivism (see, e.g., Pickering
1995; Elam 1994) However, there is no inconsistency in invoking cate-
gories of social theory in social constructivist analyses. Social construc-
tivist explanations proceed by deconstructing entities in terms of the
activity of other entities, specifically social groups. These entities are
often not deconstructed themselves for pragmatic reasons because de-
construction has to stop somewhere. For instance, Bijker’s (1992) social
constructivist analysis of fluorescent lamps refers to the involvement of
General Electric as a “real” entity. As Bijker (1993) later explained, his
primary interest had been the social construction of fluorescent lamps,
and not the social construction of General Electric. Because of this spe-
cific interest, it was excusable to present some parts of the sociotechnical
world as fixed and as undeconstructed entities that function in the ex-
planation of the development of fluorescent lamps, even though these
entities are social constructions as well. But if reference can be made to
General Electric in social explanation, then surely reference can be make
to Fordism, disembedding mechanisms, and other socially constructed
entities of social theory.19
Another criticism of modernity theories, and a reason cited for avoid-
ing them, is their alleged tendency to totalization, universalization, func-
tionalism, rationalism, panopticism, and determinism, not just in their
treatment of technology, but in their treatment of society as a whole.
This mirrors the criticism by postmodernists of macrolevel metanarra-
tives. Tom Misa has argued, for instance, that macrolevel theories tend
to “impute rationality on actors’ behalfs or posit functionality for their
actions, and to be order-driven,” and that these tendencies quickly lead
to “technological, economic or ecological determinism.” Microlevel
studies, instead, focus on “historical contingency and variety of experi-
ence” and are “disorder-respecting” (Misa 1994: p. 119). While the 
former tendencies are clearly visible in the majority of theories of
modernity, I hold that they are not inherent to macrotheorizing. The
macrostructures postulated in macrotheories inevitably impose con-
straints on the actions of individuals, but this does not mean that they
must also determine these actions. Moreover, macrostructures can be
defined as contingent, heterogeneous, and context dependent, such as
Castells’ networks.
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A final objection to macrotheories is that they are often speculative
and not elaborated or tested empirically. While there are good excep-
tions (again, Castells), these virtuoso performances confirm the general
rule. My point is that this category of theorizing should not be rejected,
but instead that these theories should be developed, tested, and refined. I
conclude, tentatively, that there are no good reasons for scholars in
technology studies to avoid macrotheories of modernity and that there
are good reasons to employ them. Working toward integrated studies of
modernity and technology involves, then, developing and testing
macrotheories and working to bridge the micro-macro gap that now
often separates modernity theory from technology studies. These two
tasks are the topic of the next section.
Modernity, Technology, and Micro-Macro Linkages
The Problem of Micro and Macro
In large part, the problem of connecting the topics of modernity and
technology, and of connecting modernity theory with technology stud-
ies, is the problem of connecting the macro with the micro. Modernity
theory typically employs a macrolevel of analysis, analyzing macrolevel
phenomena, such as late modernity and globalization, in terms of other
macrolevel phenomena, such as time-space disembedding and the grad-
ual decline in Western global hegemony. Much work in technology
studies operates at the micro level, analyzing microlevel entities such as
fluorescent lighting or the advertising of a new daylight fluorescent lamp
by reference to other microlevel entities such as “the influence of Ward
Harrison of the incandescent lamp department of General Electric” or
“the writing of a report on daylight lighting by the Electrical Testing
Committees.” In addition, one could claim that modernity theory typi-
cally employs a structure perspective, focusing on social structures 
and their properties, whereas technology studies often employ an actor
perspective.
I assume that there is a mutual need in technology studies and moder-
nity theory to bridge the gap between the micro and the macro, and be-
tween structure and actor perspectives. Nevertheless, the problem of
micro and macro (not to mention the problem of structure and agency)
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remains one of the great unsolved problems in social science. In spite of
the attention this problem has generated, there is still no recipe, no
method, and few inspiring exemplars on how to connect macrolevel and
microlevel analyses. In the discussion that follows, I try to advance this
general issue by looking more analytically at the problem. I argue that
progress on the micro-macro problem has been hampered by a failure to
recognize the multiplicity of levels of analysis (micro and macro being
coarse distinctions only) and a failure to distinguish two distinct dimen-
sions within the micro-macro distinction: size and level of abstraction. I
then outline four principal ways in which levels of analysis may map
onto each other, and conclude by drawing implications for an integra-
tion of modernity theory with technology studies.
Size and Level of Abstraction
What makes a phenomenon studied in the social sciences or humanities
a macro phenomenon? And what makes a concept a microlevel concept?
Considerable confusion exists over this matter. Sometimes it is held that
macroanalysis is distinct from microanalysis because it focuses on larger
things. Social systems are large and individuals and their actions are
small; therefore social systems are the subject of macroanalysis and indi-
viduals the subject of microanalysis. Another claim sometimes made
about the micro-macro distinction is that macrolevel phenomena and
the concepts that refer to them are abstract and general, whereas mi-
crolevel phenomena tend to be concrete and specific.
Thus there are at least two parameters along which macroanalyses are
distinguished from microanalyses: the size of the units of analysis, and
their level of abstraction.20 Very few attempts exist in the literature to
further define or operationalize these parameters, or to study their inter-
relationships. It is usually assumed that they tend to interrelate; that the
units of macrolevel analysis are typically, if not invariably, large, ab-
stract, and general, whereas things in microlevel analysis tend to be
small, concrete, and specific. Yet there are many exceptions to this rule.
For example, the modern self is both smaller and more abstract than
protest marches during the inauguration of George W. Bush. The 
modern self is a smaller unit of analysis because protest marches involve
many modern selves. It is more abstract because it refers to a general
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type of phenomenon, whereas the protest marches denote a specific type
of phenomenon. Other units of analysis do not seem to have a definite
size at all. For example, reflexivity is a property that can apply to both
large things (e.g., social systems) and small things (e.g., the knowledge
processes of organizational units).
To understand the connections between the micro and the macro, we
must therefore first better understand the parameters by which these no-
tions are defined—the notions of level of abstraction and size. I discuss
these in order.
Level of Abstraction What does it mean to say that one phenomenon
is more abstract than another? Principally, I want to argue, this means
that the phenomenon is more general. For example, rationalization is a
more general process than the standardization of testing in aviation
schools (a form of rationalization), and that is why it is more abstract.
Starting from an abstract phenomenon, one can arrive at more concrete
phenomena by introducing additional properties that bound it. Starting
with the abstract phenomenon of industrial society, one can arrive at the
more specific and therefore more concrete phenomenon of late nine-
teenth-century British industrial society by adding properties that spec-
ify time period and nationality. Likewise, starting from the notion of a
parent, one can arrive at the somewhat more concrete notion of a
mother (a female parent) by adding a gender property (female). Con-
versely, when one starts with a concrete phenomenon, one can arrive at
a more abstract one by removing properties from it. One can go from
late nineteenth-century British industrial society to industrial society and
from mother to parent by subtracting properties, that is, by generalizing.
In this way it is possible to construct hierarchies of entities that range
from abstract to concrete, with the more concrete entities being species
(subtypes or instances) of the more abstract entities. For example, one
can construct a hierarchy going from transportation vehicle to bicycle 
to Penny Farthing bicycle to the Bayliss-Thomson Ordinary Penny Far-
thing bicycle to the specific Bayliss-Thomson Ordinary Penny Farthing
bicycle of which I have a picture. Notice, however, that concretization is
not just a matter of adding adjectives (or abstraction a matter of sub-
tracting them). The relation between more abstract and more concrete
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phenomena is not always linguistically transparent, and conceptual
analysis, if not empirical investigation, may be needed to observe the re-
lation (e.g., that a mother is a type of parent, or that a standard-setting
body in health care is a type of bureaucratic organization).
Size Units of analysis can often be ordered according to their size. For
example, a social system is obviously larger than a social group in that
system, and a social group is larger than an individual in that group. The
reference to size here does not imply a reference to absolute metric or nu-
merical properties. Rather, size is used here in a relative or comparative
sense. Phenomenon a is larger than phenomenon b if a can contain b, or b
is a part of a. For example, there are part-whole relations between the
economy and the individuals participating in it because an analysis of
economic processes ultimately reveals individuals engaged in economic
behavior. This is why economic systems are larger than individuals. Large
units of analysis are larger than small units of analysis because they are
able to stand in a part-whole relation or a relation of (partial) contain-
ment to these smaller units (Castells 1996: pp. 174–179). Because parts
may have parts themselves, hierarchies can be constructed of units of
analysis that range from large to small. For example, a social system may
include a market system that includes organizations that include organi-
zational units that include divisions that include employees. Likewise, the
British railway system includes train stations that include platforms and
station staff. Also, items may be parts of multiple wholes. For example,
pay-per-view virtual museums may be part of the post-Fordist economy,
but they are also part of postmodern culture. Notice that part-whole rela-
tions between units of analysis, which refer to their size, are clearly differ-
ent from the types of genus-species relations discussed earlier, which refer
to level of abstraction. For instance, Internet advertising is a species of ad-
vertising, but a part of the post-Fordist economy.
Levels of Analysis and Their Interrelationships
What the distinction between size and level of abstraction shows is that
the micro-macro distinction encompasses at least two hierarchies: a 
hierarchy from abstract to concrete and one from large to small. Things
can be simultaneously small and abstract (the modern self) or large and
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concrete (the locations of capital cities across the globe in the year
2001). In practice, however, there are correlations between these two hi-
erarchies. What should also be clear from the discussion is that the dis-
tinction between two levels of analysis (macro and micro) or even three
levels (macro, meso, and micro) is a gross oversimplification. Going
from abstract to concrete or from large to small, many levels may be en-
countered in between. So what is commonly called the “macrolevel” in
fact relates to multiple levels of analysis that may range from very large
or abstract phenomena such as modernity, western culture, and indus-
trial society to significantly smaller or more concrete entities such as the
Internet economy, gender in late nineteenth-century France, and the
Kansai region in Japan. Similarly, microlevel phenomena may range
from larger and more abstract entities such as advertising agencies,
hackers and local area networks, to smaller or more concrete entities
such as Bill Gates, Mary’s filing of a petition, and the software error in
Fred’s computer.
The terminology of micro and macro is therefore too coarse because it
does not distinguish between size and level of abstraction, and it does
not discriminate the different levels and hierarchies that exist within
macro- and microlevel analyses. The consequence of this is that it be-
comes difficult to see how various kinds of micro- and macrolevel analy-
ses may be integrated with each other. Yet, arriving at an adequate
integration of levels of analysis is the major problem faced by theories of
modernity and technology. How do you get from a discussion of late
modernity, rationalization, and the state to a consideration of the devel-
opment and use of specific technologies? Conversely, how do you get
from talk about Pentium computers, hacker culture, and virtual commu-
nities to talk about globalization, the modern self, and post-Fordist
economies? Any adequate study of modernity and technology requires
such a bridging of the micro and the macro, of the abstract and general
and the concrete and empirical, of the large and diffuse and the small
and singular.
The major question, then, for theories of modernity and technology,
is how the gaps that exist between different levels of analysis can be
bridged. My distinction between size and level of abstraction indicates
that gaps between levels occur in two ways: because the higher level
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refers to more abstract phenomena than the lower level (e.g., bureau-
cratic organizations versus standard-setting bodies in health care), or be-
cause it refers to larger phenomena (e.g., social systems versus markets).
But my discussion also suggests how these gaps may be bridged: by
identifying genus-species relationships (for phenomena at different levels
of abstraction) and part-whole relationships (for phenomena of different
sizes). For instance, an analysis of standard-setting bodies in health care
may be linked to an analysis of bureaucratic organizations by identify-
ing standard-setting bodies as species or instances of bureaucratic orga-
nizations. Similarly, an analysis of markets may be linked to an analysis
of social systems by identifying markets as subunits within social sys-
tems. Such matches provide the conceptual links that are necessary to
connect discourses that would otherwise remain disconnected.
However, in most studies in the social sciences and humanities that
involve the linking of levels of analysis, the aim of such linking is not
merely to connect disparate discourses. Most studies have a more spe-
cific aim; for instance, explaining events at the micro level, or analyzing
the structure of macrolevel phenomena. Most studies center on a specific
macro- or microlevel phenomenon that the study aims to analyze (e.g.,
late industrial society, or changes in the design of the bicycle in the late
twentieth century). Links created to levels of analyses that are either
higher or lower than that of the analysandum are hence asymmetrical:
the higher- or lower-level entities are invoked to explain or analyze the
analysandum.
Four Types of Interlevel Analysis
When something is analyzed in terms of phenomena at another level,
these phenomena may be from a lower or a higher level, and may differ
in their level of abstraction and their size. This implies that there are
four ways in which analysis may bridge levels. I call these “decomposi-
tion” (the analysis of a larger unit in terms of smaller units), “subsump-
tion” (the analysis of a smaller unit by reference to larger units),
“deduction” (the analysis of a more concrete unit by analyzing it as a
subclass of a more general phenomenon) and “specification” (con-
cretization; analyzing a more abstract unit by analyzing one or more of
its more concrete forms). I discuss these in order.
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• In decompositional analysis (or reductive analysis), a large phenome-
non is analyzed in terms of (much) smaller phenomena. For example,
the behavior of markets (at the macro level) is analyzed as the product
of the behavior of individuals (at the micro level).
• Subsumptive analysis is the opposite of decompositional analysis.
With it, one tries to account for smaller phenomena by (partially) sub-
suming them under a larger (structural, functional, or causal) pattern of
which they are a part. For example, given the macroevent of a transition
from Fordism to post-Fordism, in which the bicycle firm Raleigh (a mi-
croentity) is one of the players, there is a modest expectation that
Raleigh will invest in product differentiation, since product differentia-
tion is part of the transition to post-Fordism (see Rosen 1993).
• In deductive analysis, a phenomenon is identified as a species or token
of a more general phenomenon, and knowledge about this more general
phenomenon is subsequently applied to the more specific phenomenon.
That is, one deduces features from the general to the specific. For exam-
ple, a regulatory agency in health care is identified as a bureaucratic orga-
nization, and one’s theory of bureaucratic organizations is subsequently
applied to it.
• In specificatory analysis, finally, a phenomenon is studied by identify-
ing and studying one or more subtypes or tokens of it. Case analysis,
when used to elaborate a more abstract analysis, is one type of specifica-
tory analysis, one that makes reference to tokens. An example of specifi-
catory analysis is Castells’ analysis of East Asian business networks (a
meso unit). Castells analyzes them by distinguishing various kinds (at
meso- and microlevels of analysis) and studying their similarities and
differences (Castells 1996: pp. 174–179).
Implications for Studies of Technology and Modernity
This perspective on levels of analysis can be used to show how moder-
nity theory can incorporate lower-level analyses in technology studies
and how technology studies can make better use of higher-level analyses
in modernity theory. To begin with the former, macrolevel modernity
theory can benefit from microlevel work in technology studies by using
such work to elaborate its macrolevel descriptions in a way that makes
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the overall account more concrete and empirical. Such elaboration can
proceed through a process of decomposition and specification in which
macro units are decomposed into smaller parts and concretized through
the identification of species or subtypes. For example, in an elaboration
of the notion of the bureaucratic organization, decomposition would
specify the components of bureaucratic organizations, and specification
would aim to distinguish various sorts of bureaucratic organizations.
Both types of analysis may be repeated to arrive at levels of analysis that
refer to ever smaller and more concrete phenomena. Such elaboration
makes macrotheories both more easily testable and more capable of in-
forming microlevel analyses. Such elaboration ultimately makes it easy
to link up with the lower-level analyses of technology studies.
The incorporation of modernity theory into studies of technology can
be similarly clarified. Here, the required types of analysis are subsump-
tion and deduction. To illustrate, Paul Rosen (1993) has attempted to use
David Harvey’s theory of the shift from a Fordist mode of production to
flexible accumulation in the late 1960s and early 1970s in an explanation
of the constant shifts in the design of mountain bikes. Connecting this 
latter fact to Harvey’s theory requires deduction (e.g., identifying it as a
species of product differentiation, a process mentioned in Harvey’s 
theory) and subsumption (e.g., identifying accompanying advertisements
as part of the dialectic of fashion and function in post-Fordist economies).
To make an adequate connection, Rosen has to do a good deal of level
building, analyzing the cycle industry and advertising at various levels.
This not only involves bottom-up construction (building up levels from his
microlevel analyses of mountain bike design, firms, and advertisements)
but also top-down construction (elaborating Harvey’s theory). This makes
it possible for him to have the two analyses meet halfway.
I conclude that integrated analyses of technology and modernity,
which build on macrotheories of modernity and microtheories of tech-
nology, are possible, although they require hard work. Analysts have to
work at level building, engaging often in decomposition, subsumption,
deduction, and specification. This, I believe, is the responsibility of both
modernity theorists and scholars in technology studies. It is a joint pro-
ject that can begin to abolish the boundaries between two now all-too-
separate fields.
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Notes
1. For some recent attempts in technology studies to appropriate (and update)
existing theories of modernity, see Feenberg (1995, 1999a), Rosen (1993), and
Slevin (2000). For attempts at a theory of modernity from within technology
studies, see Latour (1993) and Law (1994).
2. For further discussion of the notions of modernity, modernism, and modern-
ization see Featherstone (1991), Turner (1990), and Harvey (1989).
3. What is and is not a defining aspect of modernity is, of course, a matter of de-
bate. Thus, whereas some would consider gender to be just a social form within
modernity, others have argued that it a major constitutive force, and that our
very conceptions of the modern are the result of a deeply gendered ontology
(e.g., Felski 1995; Marshall, chapter 4, this volume).
4. For an account of Marx’s theory of modernity, see Antonio (2001). For
Weber, see Scaff (1989) and Turner (1993). Sayer (1991) and Giddens (1973)
treat Marx’s and Weber’s accounts jointly.
5. Compare Lyotard and Thébaud (1985: p. 9): “Postmodern is not to be taken
in a periodizing sense.” At other times, Lyotard seems to endorse an epochal con-
ception of postmodernity in which postmodernity is the cultural condition that
has resulted from the information technology revolution (cf. Lyotard 1984: p. 3).
6. For reviews of postmodern theory, see Best and Kellner (1991) and Smart
(2000).
7. For surveys of STS as an academic field, see Jasanoff et al. (1995), Cutcliffe
and Mitcham (2001), and Cutcliffe (2000).
8. See MacKenzie and Wajcman (1999) for a representative anthology of social
studies of technology, and see its introduction for a survey. See Fox (1999) for a
review of themes and approaches in the history of technology.
9. See Staudenmaier (1985) for a review of the contextual approach and its history.
10. See the respective reviews by Dosi et al. (1988) and Mitcham (1994).
Achterhuis (2001) surveys contemporary American philosophy of technology.
11. Bloor (1976) is a seminal work in SSK. Other important works include those
by Latour and Woolgar (1979, 1986) and Latour (1987).
12. See Woolgar (1991, 1996) and Bijker (1993) for accounts of the turn 
to technology in social studies of science. The early classic that marked the 
beginning of contemporary social studies of technology is still Pinch and Bijker
(1987).
13. Staudenmaier (1985: p. 201) has surveyed this for the history of technology.
My own review of issues from the year 2000 of the journals Social Studies of
Science and Science, Technology and Human Values confirms that the same is
true for social studies of technology.
14. For one of the original statements of this position, see MacKenzie and 
Wajcman (1985).
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15. Pinch and Bijker (1987) give a classical statement of social constructivism in
technology studies, specifically of the influential social construction of technol-
ogy (SCOT) approach. For a recent review of social constructivist approaches,
see Pinch (1999).
16. Based on a search on title words at Amazon.com, January 2001.
17. See Smith and Marx (1994) for a historical and Winner (1977) for a philo-
sophical critique of technological determinism.
18. For critiques of the lack of attention of (constructivist) technology studies to
sociocultural contexts, see Rosen (1993) and Winner (1993).
19. Along the same lines, the rejection by actor-network theory of social theory
because it maintains artificial distinctions between society, nature, and technol-
ogy is also overstated because these distinctions are not evident in many con-
cepts in social theory. Such notions as disembedding mechanisms (Giddens),
rationalization (Weber), and the Net (Castells) are all defined as sociotechnical
phenomena.
20. Time scale is an often-mentioned third parameter (see Edwards, chapter 7 in
this volume). It is often claimed that macro-analysis typically analyzes processes
stretching over years or even centuries, whereas micro-analysis covers shorter
time spans, ranging from minutes to months.
21. My claim that large units of analysis may have smaller units of analysis as
parts does not imply the reductionist claim that larger units of analysis are
wholly composed of smaller units of analysis and therefore can be analyzed
without remainder in terms of these smaller units and their relation to one 
another. I am skeptical about this.
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